



IRSTI 21.41.45
Research article

<https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2024-147-2-288-307>

The Visibility of Religion and Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere in Central Asian Countries

Daurjan Byerdimurat 

Ondokuz Mayis University, Samsun, Turkey

(E-mail: dauka_bts@yahoo.com)

Abstract. The Central Asian countries endured nearly seven decades of Soviet rule under the USSR, during which all manifestations of religious expression were suppressed, and religion was systematically marginalized from the public domain. However, following their independence in 1991, there has been a discernible surge in the prominence of religion within the Central Asian states. Despite the contentious nature of its resurgence, there has been a rapid revitalization of religious practices, evidenced by the establishment of mosques and madrasas, and a noticeable integration of religion into public life. Concurrently, these nations have remained steadfast in their commitment to maintaining secular institutions, including politics and education. Through a sociological lens, this article endeavors to investigate the role of religion and the utilization of religious symbols within the public sphere of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—representative of the Central Asian states in the post-independence era.

Keywords: Sociology of Religion; Central Asia; Religion in the Public Sphere; Religious Symbols.

Received 01.04.2024. Revised 05.04.2024. Accepted 25.05.2024. Available online 30.06.2024.

For citation:

Byerdimurat D. The Visibility of Religion and Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere in Central Asian Countries // Bulletin of the L.N. Gumilyov ENU. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 2024. – Vol. 147. – No. 2. – P. 288-307. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2024-147-2-288-307>

Для цитирования:

Бердимурат Д. Проявление религии и религиозных символов в общественной сфере в странах Центральной Азии // Вестник Евразийского национального университета имени Л.Н. Гумилева. Серия: Исторические науки. Философия. Религиоведение – 2024. – Т. 147. – No. 2. – С. 288-307. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2024-147-2-288-307>

Introduction

The visibility of religion in the public sphere has been a subject of significant controversy in the modern era, particularly within the context of Central Asia. This region experienced nearly seven decades of top-down communist and atheist rule, where all forms of religious expression and practice were vigorously suppressed using various social institutions such as the military, politics, and education. The primary objective was to eliminate religious influence from public life, and this approach was largely successful during the Soviet era.

The transition to independence in the Central Asian Turkic Republics marked a pivotal shift, raising questions about the resurgence of religious visibility and its role in society. Scholars have debated whether this transition represents a "return to the essence" of traditional religious practices or the emergence of new and distinct forms of religious expression that reflect contemporary dynamics. In the theoretical framework of social sciences, scholars like Berger, Habermas, Bruce, and Max Weber have provided insights into the relationship between modernization and religion (Furseth ve Repstad, 2011: 181). While Weber's perspective anticipates the decline of traditional religious institutions with modernization, others like Bellah and Casanova argue that religion remains a potent force for collective action and social unity in modern societies.

The unique socio-political context of Central Asia, emerging from decades of atheist governance, presents a compelling case study for exploring these theoretical debates. After gaining independence from Soviet rule, Central Asian states have undergone transformations in their religious landscape, with varying degrees of religious revival and adaptation.

This article seeks to analyze the post-independence religious visibility in the public sphere of the Central Asian Turkic Republics and examine how the Soviet regime's suppression of religion continues to impact contemporary religious dynamics. Specifically, the study aims to explore how religious institutions and practices have evolved in response to changing political and social circumstances following independence. By examining these developments, the article intends to shed light on the complex interplay between religion, society, and governance in the post-Soviet Central Asian context.

It is widely acknowledged that political, institutional, and bureaucratic changes within a country do not necessarily entail the complete abolition of existing systems. Consequently, our study seeks to establish a foundation for comparative analysis by briefly examining the historical context. Against this backdrop, the study initially delves into the era of the USSR, which profoundly transformed the presence and visibility of religion in the public sphere of Central Asia, followed by an exploration of post-independence developments in the emergence of religion in public life.

To focus this analysis, the study narrows its scope to three prevailing debates concerning religion and the use of religious symbols in the public sphere: religion within political discourse, public worship, and the display of religious symbols. To further refine this discussion, the study specifically analyzes two prominent religious symbols - the veil/headscarf for women and beard growth for men. These symbols are emblematic of religious identity and serve as focal points for societal debates.

It is important to note that this study does not encompass the broader discussion of all religions present in the public sphere of Central Asian states, as multiple religions are active in most of these nations today. Therefore, the analysis primarily focuses on the visibility of Islam in the public domain, considering it is the predominant religion in the region. Occasional reference is made to other religions where relevant; however, these are only addressed superficially, as a comprehensive examination would warrant separate study.

Historical Background: The Visibility of Religion in the Public Sphere in Central Asia during the Soviet Era

Today's relations between religion and the state and the visibility of religion in the public sphere in Central Asia must be placed in the context of the attacks against the presence of religion in the public sphere and the anti-religious policies of the Bolsheviks when they came to power in 1917, the emergence of the national split in 1924 and the realization of the revolution in 1928. This section therefore briefly examines the visibility of religion in the public sphere in the Central Asian countries during the period of the USSR.

Historically, the debate on the presence and influence of religion in the public sphere in Central Asia is directly related to the decisions made during the Soviet period and their practices on this issue. The Bolsheviks who seized power after the October Revolution resorted to the Marxist interpretation of dialectical materialism to completely dominate and reshape the existing socio-cultural and political structures. The understanding of religion in Marxism, to put it in general terms, involves the rejection of all forms of religious belief and supernatural forces and the fight against them. This approach and attitude formed one of the most important principles of the Bolshevik Communist Party (hereafter CP). Atheism, one of the basic elements of Marxism, was not only allowed in the Soviet Union, but was accepted as “an official religion” and used as a means to combat other religions and beliefs (Erşahin, 2007:128). The practices of the time also show that the political and military administrations were largely in favour of these approaches and practices.

Lenin adopted and elaborated upon the theories of Marx and Engels, and subsequently, his ideas and policies served as the ideological foundation for the religious policies implemented by the Bolsheviks, who seized power to advance the establishment of a communist society and the realization of the revolution. In the theories of Marx and Engels, religion presents a significant challenge. This issue forms the basis of—and marks a departure in—their philosophical and political thought. Both thinkers take a critical stance towards religion, viewing it as deeply alienating for humanity. Therefore, the elimination of religion is deemed essential for human emancipation and liberation (Barbier, 1999: 319).

Lenin expresses the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party's attitude toward religion as follows:

Social democracy bases its entire worldview on scientific socialism, i.e. on Marxism. The philosophical basis of Marxism, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasised, is dialectical materialism, which has completely taken over the historical traditions of eighteenth-century materialism in France and of Feuerbach (first half of the nineteenth century) in Germany —a materialism which is absolutely atheistic and absolutely hostile to all religion (Lenin, 2017: 27).

Lenin also touches on the necessity of propaganda to fight against religion. Regarding this issue, he claims:

We must fight against religion—this is the ABC of all materialism, ultimately of Marxism. But the ABC of Marxism is not a stagnant kind of materialism. Marxism goes further. We must know how to fight against religion, and for this, we must explain the source of faith and religion among the masses in a materialist way. The war against religion cannot and should not be limited to abstract ideological preaching. This war must be combined with the concrete practice of the class movement that aims to eliminate the social origins of religion (Lenin, 2017: 31).

The Bolsheviks, guided by the aforementioned ideas in shaping their religious policies, adopted a harsh and uncompromising stance towards religion immediately upon seizing power in 1917. Nevertheless, their approach to religion exhibited variations across different regions. While they enforced stringent policies towards religion in the core territories of the USSR according to their preferences, they adopted a relatively more moderate approach in Central Asia. (Byerdimurat, 2021: 82-85).

When Stalin came to power, domination of the Central Asian countries was fully secured. Afterwards, Stalin emphasised the need to initiate a new phase of revolution and began to work for the establishment of socialism (Khalid 90). This period is crucial for understanding the presence of religion in the public sphere of the USSR and thus in Central Asia. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to cover the entire policy and practice of the Bolsheviks. Therefore, only the presence and visibility of religion in the public sphere were briefly examined in relation to the topic.

In Central Asia, anti-religious policies were implemented through various methods, with propaganda tactics being a primary approach. The establishment of the Militant Godless League exemplifies this strategy, aimed at disseminating anti-religious speeches and propaganda in Central Asian territories. The league, officially comprised of volunteers, received support from the party and state apparatus. Beginning in 1928, the organization launched the publication "The Godless" in Central Asia. This magazine sought to scientifically debunk and criticize the foundations of religion, aligning with Lenin's ideas that emphasized a critical approach towards religious beliefs (Khalid, 2011: 84).

Between 1927 and 1929, religious schools, madrasas, courts, and mosques were systematically closed and their structures demolished in Central Asia. This period witnessed the arrest, execution, or exile to labor camps of thousands of ulama (religious scholars), clergy, and community leaders. Those who survived often chose to remain silent out of fear.

The closure of traditional schools, madrasas, and religious courts significantly obstructed the avenues for the dissemination of Islam in Central Asia (Khalid, 201: 87). Additionally, key religious practices such as pilgrimage (hajj) and almsgiving (zakat), considered fundamental acts of worship in Islam, were prohibited. The ritual slaughter of animals, another essential Islamic practice, was also banned. Public displays of worship were completely forbidden, effectively eliminating religion, along with its legal and customary aspects, from the public sphere.

The campaign against religion aimed at complete eradication from the public sphere persisted until the outbreak of the Second World War. With the onset of the war, anti-religious activities and propaganda were either suspended or had to be halted due to shifting priorities. The

German occupation forces began to promise religious freedoms to Muslims and other groups in the regions they controlled. In response to these developments, the Bolshevik authorities started to grant a degree of religious freedom to the people of Central Asia and the wider USSR.

Consequently, mosques that had been previously closed in Central Asia were gradually reopened. The Militant Godless League organization mentioned earlier was disbanded. Four Religious Affairs Administrations were established to oversee Muslim religious affairs within the USSR. The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (referred to as SADUM) emerged as the religious authority for five countries in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (Peyrouse, 2007: 41). When these religious administrations were first established, their duties and powers — insofar as they were only religious in nature — included the administration of places of worship and mosques, the maintenance of places important and sacred to Muslims, and the administration of the official religious ministers who performed the religious ceremonies (Erşahin, 2007: 238).

Although religion was not officially recognized, its reappearance in society was a sign of the continuity of religious life. In particular, the moderate attitude towards religion that occurred after the dissolution of religious structures by the clergy in the 1930s can be seen as a factor preventing religious memory from being completely interrupted among the Kazakhs (Toktarova, 2021: 64-65).

SADUM was active until the collapse of the USSR. However, the orders for this religious administration were issued by the CP. It mitigated the contradictions and disagreements between the state of the USSR and the Muslims. Over time, this administration became a complete propaganda tool of the state. Later it developed into an institution that controlled a certain number of open mosques and thus achieved a symbolic effect. However, it can be said that it also fulfilled some important tasks in the field of religion, considering that political and cultural continuity was guaranteed in Central Asia when Brezhnev took office in 1960. From that time onwards, the heads of the countries affiliated to the institution remained unchanged for more than twenty years. The continuity that was ensured during this period enabled the localisation of culture and politics to a certain extent. Of course, the religious institution in question was also affected by this situation (Byerdimurat, 2021: 97-100).

Parallel Islam or the clergy were supported to a certain extent by the religious affairs administration without the official administration knowing about it. Although the government wanted religious activities to be monitored and registered by the Religious Affairs Administration, it cannot be said that this was fully realised. However, as Bennigsen points out in his apt analysis (Bennigsen, Quelquejay, 1988: 214), these two religious organisations needed each other. Both aimed to educate the public about religious issues. Both also tried to survive in an atheistic and anti-religious system. However, it cannot necessarily be said that these two institutions provided sufficient religious education and training. For the most part, they trained religious officials to administer religious ceremonies during transitional periods.

Despite the aforementioned efforts and initiatives, the sustained attacks and propaganda aimed at eradicating religion from the public sphere during the USSR period largely achieved success. This era witnessed significant destruction of institutions crucial for the propagation of Islam, along with its primary resources such as trained scholars. Furthermore, educational

institutions, vital for societal socialization and development, were completely divorced from religion or imbued with anti-religious content and policies under a materialist ideological framework. It is recognized that similar top-down methods to reshape society through the disassociation of educational institutions from religion have been implemented in other parts of the world, albeit in varying forms and contexts.

The Visibility of Religion in the Public Sphere in the Central Asian Turkic States in Post-Independence Period

In the last phase of the USSR, and especially after independence, there was a religious revival in Central Asia. However, this revitalisation did not translate into adequate public visibility. The areas that can be considered as criteria are political debates, public worship and the use of religious symbols. Although the national administrators of Central Asia supported religion to a certain extent in the early period of independence, they pursued policies that kept influential main areas such as politics and education secular. Moreover, in the early years of independence, they supported religion (Islam) as part of the nation-building process, but did not base the legitimacy of the state on religion (Islam). Due to the influence of past laws and practices, they remained cautious about the presence of religion in the public sphere. The socio-political reasons for this approach will be discussed below in the context of the topic of religion in the public sphere in the Central Asian states in the post-independence period.

Religion in Political Debates

In the post-independence period of Central Asian countries, religion was not openly permitted to be discussed in political contexts, as had been the case during the Soviet era. This restriction was explicitly articulated in religious laws to maintain the previous stance on separating religion from political discourse. For instance, although religious parties were established in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, their activities were prohibited under religious laws. (Byerdimurat, 2021: 119-128, Adilet.zan.kz, 2011, Religion.gov.kg, 2008).

The presence of religion in political debates in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has not been the subject of much discussion compared to other countries. In Kyrgyzstan, however, religion occupies an important place in political debates. This can be attributed to the political system of the countries in question. In the post-independence period, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan introduced the presidential system, while Kyrgyzstan adopted the parliamentary system. So while elections in Kyrgyzstan are controversial, in the other two countries they are held symbolically, as in the Soviet era. As it can be understood, the state's administrative system is directly determinant of the presence of religion more or less in political debates because, as Eren mentioned (Eren, 2012: 624), "To be in power in the parliamentary system necessitates developing programs and policies in line with the needs of people in order to demand votes from them". In Kyrgyzstan, the necessity to appeal to religious sentiments and accommodate the religious demands of the populace during elections has resulted in politicians engaging with religious issues, either in support of or in opposition to religious interests. Conversely,

in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where electoral dynamics differ and there is less reliance on securing votes through religious appeals, religion has rarely been incorporated into political discourse or electoral campaigns. Consequently, this approach has mitigated the politicization of religion in these regions.

In an article, political scientist Arsen Usenov claims that the religious sphere, which should be separated from politics in Kyrgyzstan, has on the contrary become a factor that determines the political processes in the country and is even used as an instrument to achieve political goals. According to Usenov, the main reasons for the politicisation of Islam in Kyrgyzstan are the traditional cultural crisis, the lack of a national ideology, which led to the search for new forms of social organisation, the low level of religious education, the inability of the clergy to determine the boundaries between religion and politics, the effect of external religious factors and the dysfunctionality of the political system, so that voters cannot find alternatives in their preferences (Usenov, 2020). It should be noted that many of these questions are also valid for other Central Asian states. The question therefore arises: “Why is the religion of Islam not politicised in these countries?” In our opinion, religion plays a greater role in the political arena in Kyrgyzstan than in other countries because the country is more liberal and democratic. In contrast, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan control the political and religious spheres to a greater extent (Somuncuoğlu, 2009: 419-421). For this reason, unlike Kyrgyzstan, there is no opposing political structure to challenge the government in these two countries. This explains why the religion of Islam is less discussed in the public sphere in these countries.

The absence of discussions about religion in other Central Asian countries, in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, can be attributed to the lack of a democratic environment in these nations and the stringent control maintained over the religious sphere. This similarity extends to all post-Soviet Turkic Republics, including Azerbaijan (Hasanov 2011, Byerdimurat 2021). In these countries, policies aimed at excluding religion from the public sphere and upholding secularism, akin to the Soviet era, persist.

Worship in Public Sphere

One of the most important issues in relation to the visibility of religion in the public sphere is the question of public worship. Although the faith aspect of religions can be considered personal, most of the practices required by faith transcend personal space and become visible in the public sphere. In this sense, discussions of “religious freedom” or “secularism” focus on the manner of religious rituals that may be performed with religious motives or take place in public space, which inevitably involves the presence of other people.

The issue of public worship continues to be the subject of debate in Central Asian countries even after independence. In Uzbekistan in particular, public worship is subject to strict restrictions. There are also a number of restrictions on public worship in Kazakhstan. Although there are similar restrictions in Kyrgyzstan as in these two countries, they are not implemented in practice.

The law on religion adopted in Kazakhstan in 2011 introduced regulations on the performance of prayers in public spaces, the sale and distribution of religious works and other information

materials with religious content. The corresponding regulation is contained in Article 7 of the aforementioned law. Accordingly, the third paragraph of the relevant article states:

Worshiping, organizing religious ceremonies, and doing missionary work are prohibited in government offices and bodies, the armed forces, other troops and military units, the judiciary and law enforcement forces, public safety, other services related to the protection of life and health of individuals and the land and buildings of educational institutions except for religious education institutions (Adilet.zan.kz, 2011).

In Kazakhstan, in the early periods of independence, public worship was free. However, with the adoption of the new religious law in 2011, some restrictions were imposed on religious worship in the public sphere. For example, worship in public buildings and educational institutions was prohibited (Adilet.zan.kz, 2011). At the time, Hayrat Lama Sharif, the head of the Religious Affairs Agency, defended this prohibition as follows:

As everyone knows, the prayer (salah) is five times a day. It is morning, noon, afternoon, evening, and night. In this context, if we think about the prayer in public buildings, only the afternoon prayer coincides with the working hours. They can perform the other four daily prayers at home or in the mosque. Islam is the religion of ease. According to the Hanafi school, the afternoon prayer can be combined with the evening prayer. In the introduction of the law, we reported that it recognizes the historical role of the Hanafism sect of Islam and the Orthodox sect of Christianity in the spiritual heritage of the people and the development of their culture and civilization. There is no violation of the Shari'a here (Sharif, 2011).

In Kazakhstan, the current trend is to confine religious worship strictly to designated religious sites. Indeed, in 2017, an amendment to the religious law introduced regulations specifying the permissible locations for religious worship, stipulating those religious ceremonies may only take place in designated places of worship (egemen.kz 2018).

The information presented indicates that worship in public spaces is legally prohibited in Kazakhstan. However, authorities have struggled to provide satisfactory explanations for this restriction on public worship. The reasoning often revolves around the secular nature of the state, although justifications such as religious freedom and compatibility with Sharia law are also offered. These responses suggest that religious explanations are utilized to legitimize the prohibition. It is noteworthy that there has been a degree of fluctuation in these restrictions from the early years of independence up to 2011, as observed by Beylur, who suggests that these changes reflect a periodic strategy aimed at ensuring security or maintaining stability (Beylur, 2019: 156-157). Nevertheless, it is necessary to discuss how worshiping in the public sphere may cause a security problem or which type/practice of secularism it may damage.

It can be said that the political administration of Kyrgyzstan has a more tolerant attitude towards public worship compared to other Central Asian countries. In the religious laws adopted in 1992 and 2008, there are no provisions restricting public worship (Appasova, 2019: 25). For this reason, unlike in other Central Asian countries, the boundary for public worship is not clear.

In connection with the discussion and the draft law, the then President Almazbek Atambayev stated that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, but religious leaders should not be allowed to interfere in politics” and made the following comments on the issue:

‘Similar to Muslims, representatives of other religions are completely free to practise their religion. There has not been a single case in Kyrgyzstan where anyone has complained about

being prevented from attending Friday prayers. The heads of institutions and enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, are obliged to solve these problems individually so that believers can perform their religious rituals. The government and local authorities are also obliged to help resolve such problems when they arise (Sputnik.kg, 2016).

The discussions surrounding religious practices within the public sphere at the parliamentary level warrant academic evaluation as a manifestation of societal demand. However, the ability to engage with these issues within Kyrgyzstan's parliament suggests the presence of a relatively more democratic environment compared to its Central Asian counterparts. Consequently, it can be argued that this scenario fosters a zone of relative freedom, potentially facilitating a quicker revival of religious activity compared to neighboring countries. (Pay, 2012: 1792). However, it seems very difficult to discuss these issues in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for now.

The issue of free worship in the public sphere has been contentious in Uzbekistan since its initial period of independence, resulting in clear limitations. In contrast, the discussion around religion in the public sphere was not prominent in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the early years of independence up until the 2000s. Consequently, these two countries could be viewed as relatively more liberal compared to Uzbekistan, despite the presence of certain restrictions or limitations on religious expression.

The law on religion passed in Uzbekistan in 1998 created a legal framework for penalising all religious activities that the state could not control. Khalid expresses this as follows: *"This law considers the church, like its Soviet predecessor, as a model for all religious organisations. Islamic worship does not require such a form of organisation, but the state now prescribes it. Mosques - the centre of communities must now be registered or closed"* (Khalid, 2011: 189). In this regard, Article 14 of the 1998 Religion Law states *that worship and religious ceremonies outside of public places of worship and prayer must be conducted in accordance with the procedures set out in the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan*. However, as the procedures are not fully specified in the legislation, worship outside places of worship is in practice subject to authorisation, so praying outside the mosque can be considered a violation of the law (Khalid, 2011: 190). For example, Nodir Ahadov of the Uzbek Human Rights Association told Forum 18 in 2013 that people are reluctant to pray together in their homes during Ramadan because, according to religious law, joint worship outside the mosque is subject to authorisation. In addition, the authorities have banned joint iftar. They are known to exert pressure on those who organise mass iftars (Bayram 2013). Children were also banned from visiting mosques in Uzbekistan in 2018. Muhammadbobur Yuldashev, an official of the Religious Affairs Commission, defended this ban as follows:

Those are not adults. They cannot distinguish between good and evil. Mosques are holy places. In mosques, adults will purify themselves. They go to places of worship after cleaning their bodies and clothes. Even our Prophet forbade minors to go to the mosque (Haksözhaber, 2018).

Similarly, Islamic religious education in Uzbekistan is carried out only in institutions opened by the state for religious education. This issue is expressed in Article 9 of the 1998 religious law as follows: *Citizens may get religious education only in institutions that provide religious education and operate with the permission of the relevant central governing body. Private religious*

education is prohibited. In other words, education is prohibited except for the thirteen madrasas opened for religious education.

This prohibition also includes religious instruction, which takes place in mosques without the permission of the mufti. Attempts have also been made to ban the traditional reading of the Koran (Hatim) after noon prayers and Friday prayers in Uzbekistan. After the explosion of the Tashkent bombings in 1999, going to mosques after prayer was also banned — with a secret order from the Ministry of Interior (İCG, 2003: 9-10). Furthermore, in 2013, a Muslim father and his son who taught the Koran to school-age children in Tashkent were sentenced to up to three years in prison. Parents who took their children to private Islamic religious instruction were also fined (Corley, 2013). It is in itself a problematic approach to take another religion or sect as a model for Islam when it comes to where and how religious rituals are performed. Although it seems that such practices are legitimized through secularism, in fact, it is obvious that it corresponds to a top-down imposing secularist approach, examples of which are seen in different justifications and styles in the world.

The Use of Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere

Wearing the hijab and growing a beard in public buildings and educational institutions has been the most important agenda item in the recent debates on secularism in Central Asia. While beard growing is not much of a problem in Kyrgyzstan, there have been severe restrictions on this issue in Kazakhstan and, especially, in Uzbekistan. This section focuses on the analysis of legal regulations and discussions on the headscarf for women and beard growing for men, which are seen as religious symbols in these three countries. Regulations and discussions concerning other religious symbols are excluded from the scope of the article.

There had been no discussion about the headscarf in Kazakhstan since the independence until 2007. There had also been no restrictions imposed on individuals in this process. The debate started in 2007 and peaked after the amendment of the religious law in 2011 (Beylur, 2019: 148).

The following statement by the former President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev on this issue is significant in terms of revealing the approach of the state:

We are Muslims. However, there are different movements in Islam. We must protect our people from their harmful influence. We should be aware that we are Muslims, but we should not drag people into the Middle Ages. Everyone's opinion is important to us, but the Arab dress that our girls and women wear is not our style. Kazakhs were nomadic people; we have had our own way since ancient times. Kazakhs have followed Sunni Islam throughout history. Therefore, we should not imitate Muslims in other countries (Bagai, Glushkova, 2012).

Following all these discussions, wearing the hijab or headscarf and all other clothing that could directly or indirectly mean religious propaganda was banned in educational institutions of Kazakhstan in 2016 (Najibullah, 2017). It is also worth mentioning that the ban in question addresses secondary education. Even though it is not welcome at universities, no prohibition is involved. In fact, the religious law adopted in 2011 does not involve any other statement regarding religious clothing and beard. However, the prohibitions on the issue of the headscarf

(hijab) that gave rise to much debate have been justified on the grounds that it does not comply with the secularist provision in Article 1 of the Constitution.

Kazakhstani administrators resorted to three methods to justify restrictions on the visibility of religion in the public sphere through clothing or other symbols. The first is the claim that it is not appropriate to wear a headscarf in schools due to the secular nature of the state. The second is the assessment that the headscarf is not in line with national and cultural codes. Finally, the statements of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Kazakhstan on religion are cited as references.

The use of religious symbols in the public sphere in Kyrgyzstan is more tolerant than in other Central Asian countries. For example, whereas the presence of a bearded person in public space is not a subject of discussion in Kyrgyzstan, there are some restrictions in Uzbekistan, even if there is no official regulation on growing a beard (Kozukulov, 2014: 103). The press has reported cases in Uzbekistan where bearded men are stopped in the streets and markets and taken to police stations to be questioned (Liberty, 2016).

The wearing of women's headscarves has been a topic of debate in specific contexts and environments within Kyrgyzstan. While there is no official prohibition against wearing a headscarf in schools, universities, or government institutions, it is generally advised against doing so. Discussions regarding the headscarf in higher education institutions have been rare. (Sooronbaeva 2019).

The Ministry of Education of Kyrgyzstan does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether students may wear a headscarf but refers to the necessity of wearing school uniforms, which may lead to individual cases where female students and teachers wearing headscarves face discrimination and misunderstanding (Sooronbaeva, 2019). The controversy arises from the requirement that the Kyrgyz education system remain secular and school uniforms are standardized. Both in public and private schools of the country, standardized uniforms are required. Moreover, in 2015, the Ministry of Education of Kyrgyzstan enacted a decision defining the clothes that should be worn in schools. In this decision, the school uniform for girls consists of a classic style blouse, vest, skirt, trousers, dress, and jacket (Bakanlıđı, 2015). However, some experts think that the decision of the Ministry of Education on the uniform does not involve the headscarf. For example, lawyer Zhibek Kenzhebekova claims that the requirements for school uniforms do not cover the ban on wearing headscarves at school because, according to him, the headscarf is not included in the list of clothes to be worn in schools by the law adopted by the Ministry of Education (2018). In order to put an end to these discussions, the Ministry of Education has made a detailed statement about the characteristics of the clothing that should be worn in schools. According to the statement, wearing "clothes symbolizing different religious affiliations" is prohibited (AdaletBakanlıđı 2015). Thus, it is not considered appropriate for female students attending secondary school to wear a headscarf since it is regarded as a religious symbol.

The quote by the president of the time, Almazbek Atambayev, sheds light on the general attitude of the state toward the prohibition of the headscarf in schools:

He stated that the ban on the headscarf in schools is appropriate and necessary for secularism. Moreover, he also reported that the Islamic way of dressing is not required for young people and students. He said that this position is a requirement of the secular character of the state, as

emphasized in its Constitution. Therefore, he supported the efforts of the authorities to prevent girls from wearing a headscarf in schools... Moreover, he argued that Islam should be manifested not by clothing but by good morals, purity of mind, and good behavior... In addition, if someone is to impose hijab or niqab on us today as the Islamic dress, tomorrow they may regard those who wear the Kyrgyz national clothes or those who wear modern clothes as non-Muslims. The Holy Quran does not mention Islamic or non-Islamic clothing. According to Islam, people should dress clean and nice (dunyabulteni.net, 2015).

Atambayev's views correspond to the earlier discussions about the headscarf in Kazakhstan given above. In both cases, cultural references have been highlighted, and the constitutional secularity of the state has been emphasized. Thus, it can be said that the effects of the anti-religious attitudes and policies implemented in the Soviet period in Central Asian countries continue today, albeit on different grounds.

The visibility of religious symbols in the public sphere in Uzbekistan became a subject of debate starting in the mid-1990s. The debate reached its peak with the Religion Act, which was approved in 1998. It is claimed that this law was written ambiguously to facilitate its widespread application, and the practices mentioned above actually strengthen this opinion. The ban on wearing religious clothing in public is a good example of this ambiguity. According to Article 14 of the 1998 Religion Act, *citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan are not allowed to wear religious clothing in public (except for religious officials)*. However, it is not clear what is meant here by religious clothing. Hence, most of the time, people prefer to wear national or modern clothes. In 2012, the sale of headscarves and veils, which were declared to be against the Uzbek culture, was also prohibited in Uzbekistan (Omelicheva, 2016).

In Uzbekistan, it is considered a violation of the law for men to grow a beard and wear a turban or a robe, which are regarded as religious clothing, or other religious clothing that are not part of the Uzbek national clothing. The clergy, on the other hand, is exempted from this prohibition. Women who wear the headscarf in the social arena, and thus break the law are punished. According to the new regulation adopted after 2021, it has become permissible to wear a headscarf in public on the condition that lighter colors are used instead of a black headscarf (azattyq.org). However, the ban is still in effect in schools (adyrna.kz, 2021).

It is also known that sometimes the police force young men to shave their beards. Some fans who came to watch the football match played between Bukhara and Navbahor in 2016 were not allowed into the stadium on the grounds that they grew their beards. Speaking to Radio Liberty about this issue, a fan told that undercover policemen stopped the fans with the long beard and said: "Go cut your beard, only then you can enter." and that many fans were not allowed in because they could not shave their beards (Liberty, 2016). Moreover, some Uzbek citizens who expressed their opinion on the condition of anonymity stated that several bearded university students have been prevented from entering the classrooms in recent years. It was also stated that bearded men were stopped in the streets and markets and taken to police stations for questioning (Liberty, 2016)

Government offices and schools have been places where religious clothing or symbols are strictly prohibited. As in other Central Asian countries, schools in Uzbekistan have a regulation for wearing standard uniforms. It should be noted that this regulation is not made just to prevent

wearing religious clothing. The rationale for wearing a standard uniform is to hide the differences between social classes at school. It is believed that if all students who are wealthy or financially well-off wear the same uniform, children with poor financial status will see themselves as equal to children with good financial status. Thus, while there is no direct regulation regarding the headscarf in the dress regulations in these countries, a legal regulation to prohibit wearing clothing that is considered religious symbols is added to the later law, indirectly reminding the rules that must be followed.

The religious law in Uzbekistan is written very strictly, and its implementation is just as strict. To oppose the rule established by the state is to be subjected to lawsuits on charges of belonging to Wahhabis, radical or non-traditional religious movements, which occasionally leads to arrests (Byerdimurat, 2021, 152-160).

In 2019, it was reported that teachers in the Tashkent region of Uzbekistan were directed to stand at the school entrance each morning and ask female students to remove their headscarves before entering. Furthermore, under a new informal decree, Uzbek authorities have recently emphasized the need to intensify controls on headscarves and Islamic symbols in schools and other public spaces. (Najibulla 2019).

Conclusion

During the Soviet Union, Central Asian societies were subjected to a top-down policy of modernisation or secularisation. The rigid and exclusive secularist ideology became dominant in legislation and everyday life. In other words, Central Asian societies have long lived under an anti-religious and atheistic state system. In this process, the rigid and exclusive secular ideology was institutionalised and adopted in the politics of the newly independent states in Central Asia in the post-independence period and re-institutionalised in a modified form. The main reason for this is that the state system institutionalised during the Soviet era was largely preserved in these countries, which also underwent significant change with independence.

Central Asian countries have implemented policies and laws to maintain secularism and restrict religious influence in key areas such as politics, education, and the military, akin to the Soviet era. Uzbekistan has notably enforced the strictest regulations in this regard, prohibiting public worship in most places. While Kyrgyzstan technically bans headscarves in schools, this prohibition is not actively enforced, and there are generally no restrictions on worship. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan stands out as the most liberal country in the region, despite sharing legal limitations with its neighbors. This difference can be attributed to Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary system, which necessitates attention to societal preferences and inclinations, including religious practices.

It can be observed that the Central Asian states often developed inconsistent and contradictory religious policies in the post-independence period. As examined above, on the one hand, these three countries have developed policies to protect the secularity of the public sphere or to secularize the public sphere. On the other hand, as part of the nation-building process (in the first phase of independence), they have adopted practices that ensure the revitalization of religious life by supporting the construction of mosques and the opening of madrasas. However, many of

the practices that might indicate support for the religious sector in question have only symbolic value in terms of the application of their own religion. All in all, the study has shown that the rulers of the countries mentioned have adopted the exclusive secular ideology of the Soviet era, which considers religion as an element that should be anchored in the conscience, and whose effects are still visible. It should also be noted that this exclusive mentality and approach varies from country to country.

As a result, the policies developed by these states regarding the presence of religion in the public sphere reflect the immense influence of these countries' past experiences. As in the Soviet era, governments today are skeptical and uneasy about the presence of religion in the political arena. Worship and the use of religious symbols in public spaces are also subject to certain restrictions for similar reasons. There are some differences between countries in this respect. While Uzbekistan, for example, is more restrictive, Kyrgyzstan has a freer environment. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, can be placed somewhere between these two countries.

Since religion plays a crucial and comprehensive role in many individual and social spheres, it inevitably becomes the focus of religious or entirely secular governments. As can be seen from the examples discussed in this article, the core of opposition or occasional conflict in religious and non-religious spheres lies in the question of who will hold economic and political power and in what way.

It is well known that the veil and headscarf, which are considered religious symbols in many Muslim-populated countries, including Turkey, can be problematized depending on the political tradition and preference of the time. Today in the United States and Western countries, there are occasional debates and radical bans on the Islamic style of dress and its presence in the bureaucratic and public spheres. It is tragicomic that Western discussions about the veil, which is considered an Islamic symbol and part of Muslim societies, are carried out with the same attitude and rhetoric in Muslim-populated countries.

In the countries directly under study, as in many other Muslim-populated countries, it does not seem possible for the time being to develop original ideas and policies on all issues related to the faith, worship and social expression of their citizens' religion, for reasons some of which have been mentioned above. This requires at least good will, social consensus, well-trained personnel and adequate time. The task of sociology and sociologists will be to follow this process closely, to understand its development and to research it within the scientific discipline.

References

Adalet Bakanlığı, Kırgız Cumhuriyeti. "Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Resolution." Kırgız Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı. Ağustos 12, 2015. <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/97897?cl=ru-ru#unknown> (accessed Kasım 15, 2020).

Adilet.zan.kz. "Dini қызмет және dini бірлестіктер туралы." adilet.zan.kz. Ekim 11, 2011. <http://adilet.zan.kz/kaz/docs/Z1100000483#z74> (accessed Ekim 20, 2020).

Adyrna.kz. "O'zbekistanda okushylarga hidzhab kiyuge, sakal osiruge tyjym salyndy (Uzbekistan, students are not allowed to wear the hijab or grow a beard)." adyrna.kz. Temmuz 7, 2021. <https://adyrna.kz/post/77256> (accessed Aralık 17, 2021).

Appasova, Dinara. "Kırgızistan'da Din – Devlet İlişkileri: Hukuki Çerçeve(State and religion relations in Kyrgyzstan)." Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Mayıs 2019.

Bagai, Altynbek, and Svetlana Glushkova. "Nazarbaev «Zhas Otannyn» sozinde hidzhab turaly da aitty (Nazarbayev also spoke about the hijab at the Zhas Otan congress)." azattyq.org. Kasım 16, 2012. https://www.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan_nazarbayev_said_that_there_is_no_kazakh-slave/24772557.html (accessed Ekim 31, 2020).

Barbier, Maurice. Modern Batı Düşüncesinde Din ve Siyaset(La modernité politique). Translated by Özkan Gözel. İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999.

Bayram, Mushfig. "Uzbekistan: Religious freedom survey." Forum18.org. Ağustos 2013. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1862 (accessed Eylül 26, 2020).

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Chantal Lemerrier Quelquejay. Sufi ve Komiser, Rusya'da İslam Tarikatları(Mystics and commissars). Translated by Osman Türer. Ankara: Elif Matbaacılık, 1988.

Beylur, Suat. "Sosyal Değişim Sürecinde Kazakistan'da Din Devlet İlişkileri (Üniversite Öğrencileri Örneği)(In the process of social change,religion-state relations in Kazakhstan (Example of university students)." Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, 2019.

Byerdimurat, Daurijan. "Orta Asya Devletlerinde Din, Devlet ve Toplum İlişkileri (Kazakistan, Kırgızistan ve Özbekistan Örneği) (Religion, State And Society Relations In Central Asian States (Example Of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan And Uzbekistan))." Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Ağustos 2021.

Corley, Felix. "UZBEKISTAN: Teaching Islam to children a crime, raids and large fines continue." forum18.org. Temmuz 11, 2013. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1857 (accessed Ekim 29, 2020).

Dunyabulteni.net. "Kırgız cumhurbaşkanı başörtüsü yasağını savundu(Kyrgyz president defends headscarf ban)." dunyabulteni.net. Şubat 20, 2015. <https://www.dunyabulteni.net/orta-asya/kirgiz-cumhurbaskani-basortusu-yasagini-savundu-h322857.html> (accessed Ekim 29, 2020).

egemen.kz. "Қазақстанда мектеп маңындағы мешіттер сүрілмейді(In Kazakhstan, mosques near schools are not demolished)." egemen.kz. Temmuz 3, 2018. <https://egemen.kz/article/172503-qazaqstanda-mektep-manhyndaghy-meshitter-surilmeydi-qoghamdyq-damu-ministrliqi> (accessed Ekim 13, 2020).

Eren, Selim. "Din, Devlet ve Siyaset(Religion, State and Politics)." In Din Sosyolojisi, by İhsan Çapcıoğlu Niyazi Akyüz, 571-586. Ankara: Grafiker Yayınları, 2012.

Erşahin, Seyfettin. Türkistan'da İslam ve Müslümanlar(Sovyet Dönemi) (During the period of the USSR religious structure in the republics of Turkestan). Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2007.

Furseth, Inger, and Pal Repstad. Din Sosyolojisine Giriş. Ankara: Birleşik, 2011.

Haksözhaber. "Özbekistan'da Çocukların Camiye Gitmesi Yasaklandı Kaynak: Özbekistan'da Çocukların Camiye Gitmesi Yasaklandı(Children Banned from Going to Mosques in Uzbekistan Source: Children Banned from Going to Mosques in Uzbekistan)." Haksözhaber. Mart 12, 2018. <https://www.haksozhaber.net/ozbekistanda-cocuklarin-camiye-gitmesi-yasaklandi-103139h.htm> (accessed Eylül 27, 2020).

Hasanov, Behram. Bir Hafıza Zinciri Olarak Din(Religion as a Memory Chain). İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2011.

İCG. Central Asia: Islam And The State. Osh/Brussels: Group, İnternational Crisis, 2003.

Khalid, Adeb. Komünizmden Sonra İslam; Orta Asya'da Din ve Politika(Islam after Communism). Ankara: Sitre Yayınları, 2011.

Kozukulov, Timur. "Kırgızistan'da Devletin Din Siyaset(The Religion Politics Of The State In Kyrgyzstan)." Akademik Hassasiyetler Dergisi, 2014: 85-104.

Lenin. Sosyalizm ve Din (Socialism and Religion). Translated by Öner Ünalın. İstanbul: Kor Kitap, 2017.

Liberty, Radio Free Europe /Radio. "No Shave, No Soccer: Bearded Uzbek Fans Report Being Barred From Stadium." Haziran 2, 2016. <https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-soccer-fans-beards-stadium-banned/27775057.html>.

Najibulla, Farangiz. "Snjat' hidzhab u vkhoda v shkolu. «Ser'eznoe poruchenie» v Uzbekistane (Remove the hijab at the entrance to the school. "Serious assignment" in Uzbekistan)." azattyq.org. Ekim 10, 2019. <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/uzbek-teachers-get-tough-assignment-remove-their-hijabs-but-don-t-hurt-their-feelings/30208978.html>.

Najibullah, Farangiz. "Black Is Only For Funerals!' Kazakh President Calls For Ban Against Islamic Attire." rferl.org. Nisan 23, 2017. <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nazarbaev-banning-islamic-dress-black-funerals/28447008.html>.

Omelicheva, Mariya. "Islam and Power Legitimation: Instrumentalisation of Religion in Central Asian States." Contemporary Politics, 2016: 144-163.

Pay, Salih. "Kırgızistan'da İslam'ın Asimetrik Mücadelesi(The Struggle of Islam for Asymmetric Existence in Kyrgyzstan)." In Orta Asya'da İslam , by Muhammet Savaş Kafkasyalı, 1787-1827. Ankara-Türkistan: Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012.

Peyrouse, Sebastien. "The Rise of Political Islam in Soviet Central Asia." hudson. 2007. <https://www.hudson.org/research/9892-the-rise-of-political-islam-in-soviet-central-asia> (accessed Ağustos 26, 2020).

religion.gov.kg. "Kyrgyz Respublikasyndagy din tutuu jerkindigi zhana dini." Bişkek, Aralık 31, 2008.

Somuncuoğlu, Anar. "Abd'nin Demokrasi Özendirme Politikası: Kazakistan Örneği (Democracy promotion policy of the USA: the case of Kazakhstan)." Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, 2009.

Sooronbaeva, Asel. "Кыргызстан: платок – не преграда к успехам." Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Şubat 2, 2019. <https://cabar.asia/en/kyrgyzstan-hijab-not-an-obstacle-to-success>.

sputnik.kg. "Atambaev vyskazalsja po zakonoproektu o dzhuma-namaze i skandalu vokrug nego (Atambayev spoke out on the bill on Juma Prayer and the scandal surrounding it)." sputnik.kg. Haziran 10, 2016. <https://ru.sputnik.kg/politics/20160610/1026379619.html>.

Toktarova, Gulnafiz. "Toplumsal Değişme Sürecinde Dini Hayatın Yeniden Şekillenışı: Batı Kazakistan Örneği(Reformation of religious life in the process of social change: West Kazakhstan case)." Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Aralık 2021: 226.

Usenov, Arsen. "The Processes of Politicizing Islam in Kyrgyzstan: Impact on the 2020 Parliamentary Elections." Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Ağustos 7, 2020. <https://cabar.asia/en/the-processes-of-politicizing-islam-in-kyrgyzstan-impact-on-the-2020-parliamentary-elections> (accessed Ekim 14, 2020).

Sharif, Kajrat Lama. "Dastyrlı emes islamdyk agymdardyn belsendi kyzmeti ulttyk ozindik erekshelekti zhogaltuga ushyratady (Active Activities of Non-Traditional Islamic Movements Lead to the Loss of National Identity)." *interfax.kz*. Eylül 2011. https://www.interfax.kz/?lang=kaz&int_id=13&news_id=50 (accessed Aralık 20, 2020).

Дәуіржан Бердімұрат
Ондокуз Майс университеті, Самсун, Түркия

Орталық Азия елдеріндегі дін және діни рәміздердің қоғамдық салада көрінуі

Андатпа. Белгілі болғандай, Орталық Азия елдері 70 жылға жуық КСРО билігінде өмір сүрді. Осы уақыт аралығында діни көзқарас пен тәжірибенің барлық түрлері басып-жаншылды; дін қоғамдық ортадан мүлде шеттетілді. Дегенмен, Орталық Азия мемлекеттері 1991 жылы тәуелсіздік алғаннан бері діннің көрнекілігі артты. Даулы болуына қарамастан, тез діни жаңғыруға қол жеткізді: мешіттер мен медреселер ашылды; қоғамдық ортада діннің бар екені анық байқалды. Сонымен қатар, бұл елдер саясат пен білім беру сияқты институттарын зайырлы ұстауда табанды болды. Әлеуметтанулық тәсілді қолдана отырып, бұл мақала Қазақстан, Қырғызстан және Өзбекстандағы дін мен діни рәміздердің қоғамдық ортада қолданылуын зерттейді – олардың барлығы тәуелсіздік алғаннан кейінгі кезеңдегі Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің қатарына жатады.

Түйін сөздер: дін социологиясы; Орталық Азия; қоғамдық ортадағы дін; діни рәміздер.

Дауржан Бердимурат
Университет Ондокуз Маис, Самсун, Турция

Проявление религии и религиозных символов в общественной сфере в странах Центральной Азии

Аннотация. Как известно, страны Центральной Азии жили под властью СССР почти 70 лет. В течение этого периода времени все формы религиозного выражения и практики были подавлены; религия была полностью исключена из общественной сферы. Однако с тех пор, как государства Центральной Азии обрели независимость в 1991 году, заметность религии возросла. Несмотря на его неоднозначное присутствие, произошло быстрое религиозное возрождение: были открыты мечети и медресе; присутствие религии в общественной сфере стало ощутимым. В то же время эти страны были непреклонны в сохранении светских институтов, таких, как политика и образование. Применяя социологический подход, автор данной статьи исследует религию и использование религиозных символов в общественной сфере в Казахстане, Кыргызстане и Узбекистане – все они входят в число государств Центральной Азии в период после обретения независимости.

Ключевые слова: социология религии; Центральная Азия; религия в публичной сфере; религиозные символы.

Список литературы

Adalet Bakanlığı, Kırgız Cumhuriyeti. "Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Resolution." Kırgız Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı. Ağustos 12, 2015. <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/97897?cl=ru-ru#unknown> (accessed Kasım 15, 2020).

adilet.zan.kz. "Dini қызмет және dini birlestikter turaly." adilet.zan.kz. Ekim 11, 2011. <http://adilet.zan.kz/kaz/docs/Z1100000483#z74> (accessed Ekim 20, 2020).

adyrna.kz. "Ozbekstanda okushylarga hidzhab kijuge, sakal osiruge tyjym salyndy (Uzbekistan, students are not allowed to wear the hijab or grow a beard)." adyrna.kz. Temmuz 7, 2021. <https://adyrna.kz/post/77256> (accessed Aralık 17, 2021).

Appasova, Dinara. "Kırgızistan'da Din – Devlet İlişkileri: Hukuki Çerçeve(State and religion relations in Kırgyzstan)." Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Mayıs 2019.

Bagai, Altynbek, and Svetlana Glushkova. "Nazarbaev «Zhas Otannyn» sozinde hidzhab turaly da aitty (Nazarbayev also spoke about the hijab at the Zhas Otan congress)." azattyq.org. Kasım 16, 2012. https://www.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan_nazarbayev_said_that_there_is_no_kazakh-slave/24772557.html (accessed Ekim 31, 2020).

Barbier, Maurice. Modern Batı Düşüncesinde Din ve Siyaset(La modernité politique). Translated by Özkan Gözel. İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999.

Bayram, Mushfig. "Uzbekistan: Religious freedom survey." Forum18.org. Ağustos 2013. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1862 (accessed Eylül 26, 2020).

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Chantal Lemerrier. Quelquejay. Sufi ve Komiser; Rusya'da İslam Tarikatları(Mystics and commissars). Translated by Osman Türer. Ankara: Elif Matbaacılık, 1988.

Beylur, Suat. "Sosyal Değişim Sürecinde Kazakistan'da Din Devlet İlişkileri (Üniversite Öğrencileri Örneği)(In the process of social change, religion-state relations in Kazakhstan (Example of university students)." Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, 2019.

Byerdimurat, Daurjan. "Orta Asya Devletlerinde Din, Devlet ve Toplum İlişkileri (Kazakistan, Kırgızistan ve Özbekistan Örneği) (Religion, State And Society Relations In Central Asian States (Example Of Kazakhstan, Kırgyzstan And Uzbekistan))." Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Ağustos 2021.

Corley, Felix. "UZBEKISTAN: Teaching Islam to children a crime, raids and large fines continue." forum18.org. Temmuz 11, 2013. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1857 (accessed Ekim 29, 2020).

dunyabulteni.net. "Kırgız cumhurbaşkanı başörtüsü yasağını savundu(Kyrgyz president defends headscarf ban)." dunyabulteni.net. Şubat 20, 2015. <https://www.dunyabulteni.net/orta-asya/kirgiz-cumhurbaskani-basortusu-yasagini-savundu-h322857.html> (accessed Ekim 29, 2020).

egemen.kz. "Қазақстанда мектеп маңындағы мешіттер сүрілмейді(In Kazakhstan, mosques near schools are not demolished)." egemen.kz. Temmuz 3, 2018. <https://egemen.kz/article/172503-qazaqstanda-mektep-manhyndaghy-meshitter-surilmeydi-qoghamdyq-damu-ministrliqi> (accessed Ekim 13, 2020).

Eren, Selim. "Din, Devlet ve Siyaset(Religion, State and Politics)." In Din Sosyolojisi, by İhsan Çapcıoğlu Niyazi Akyüz, 571-586. Ankara: Grafiker Yayınları, 2012.

Erşahin, Seyfettin. Türkistan'da İslam ve Müslümanlar(Sovyet Dönemi) (During the period of the USSR religious structure in the republics of Turkestan). Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2007.

Furseth, Inger, and Pal Repstad. Din Sosyolojisine Giriş. Ankara: Birleşik, 2011.

Haksözhaber. "Özbekistan'da Çocukların Camiye Gitmesi Yasaklandı Kaynak: Özbekistan'da Çocukların Camiye Gitmesi Yasaklandı(Children Banned from Going to Mosques in Uzbekistan Source: Children Banned from Going to Mosques in Uzbekistan)." Haksözhaber. Mart 12, 2018. <https://www.haksözhaber.net/ozbekistanda-cocuklarin-camiye-gitmesi-yasaklandi-103139h.htm> (accessed Eylül 27, 2020).

Hasanov, Behram. Bir Hafıza Zinciri Olarak Din(Religion as a Memory Chain). İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2011.

İCG. Central Asia: Islam And The State. Osh/Brussels: Group, İnternational Crisis, 2003.

Khalid, Adeeb. Komünizmden Sonra İslam; Orta Asya'da Din ve Politika(Islam after Communism). Ankara: Sitre Yayınları, 2011.

Kozukulov, Timur. "Kırgızistan'da Devletin Din Siyaset(The Religion Politics Of The State In Kyrgyzstan)." Akademik Hassasiyetler Dergisi, 2014: 85-104.

Lenin. Sosyalizm ve Din (Socialism and Religion). Translated by Öner Ünalın. İstanbul: Kor Kitap, 2017.

Liberty, Radio Free Europe /Radio. "No Shave, No Soccer: Bearded Uzbek Fans Report Being Barred From Stadium." Haziran 2, 2016. <https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-soccer-fans-beards-stadium-banned/27775057.html>.

Najibulla, Farangiz. "Snjat' hidzhab u vkhoda v shkolu. «Ser'eznoe poruchenie» v Uzbekistane (Remove the hijab at the entrance to the school. "Serious assignment" in Uzbekistan)." azattyq.org. Ekim 10, 2019. <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/uzbek-teachers-get-tough-assignment-remove-their-hijabs-but-don-t-hurt-their-feelings/30208978.html>.

Najibullah, Farangis. "Black Is Only For Funerals!' Kazakh President Calls For Ban Against Islamic Attire." rferl.org. Nisan 23, 2017. <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nazarbaev-banning-islamic-dress-black-funerals/28447008.html>.

Omelicheva, Mariya. "Islam and Power Legitimation: Instrumentalisation of Religion in Central Asian States." Contemporary Politics, 2016: 144-163.

Pay, Salih. "Kırgızistan'da İslam'ın Asimetrik Mücadelesi(The Struggle of Islam for Asymmetric Existence in Kyrgyzstan)." In Orta Asya'da İslam , by Muhammet Savaş Kafkasyalı, 1787-1827. Ankara-Türkistan: Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012.

Peyrouse, Sebastien. "The Rise of Political Islam in Soviet Central Asia." hudson. 2007. <https://www.hudson.org/research/9892-the-rise-of-political-islam-in-soviet-central-asia> (accessed Ağustos 26, 2020).

religion.gov.kg. "Kyrgyz Respublikasyndagy din tutuu jerkindigi zhana dini." Bişkek, Aralık 31, 2008.

Somuncuoğlu, Anar. "Abd'nin Demokrasi Özendirme Politikası: Kazakistan Örneği (Democracy promotion policy of the USA: the case of Kazakhstan)." Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, 2009.

Sooronbaeva, Asel. "Кыргызстан: платок – не преграда к успехам." Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Şubat 2, 2019. <https://cabar.asia/en/kyrgyzstan-hijab-not-an-obstacle-to-success.sputnik.kg>. "Atambaev vyskazalsja po zakonoproektu o dzhuma-namaze i skandalu vokrug nego

(Atambayev spoke out on the bill on Juma Prayer and the scandal surrounding it)." sputnik.kg. Haziran 10, 2016. <https://ru.sputnik.kg/politics/20160610/1026379619.html>.

Toktarova, Gulnafiz. "Toplumsal Değişme Sürecinde Dini Hayatın Yeniden Şekillenışı: Batı Kazakistan Örneği (Reformation of religious life in the process of social change: West Kazakhstan case)." Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Aralık 2021: 226.

Usenov, Arsen. "The Processes of Politicizing Islam in Kyrgyzstan: Impact on the 2020 Parliamentary Elections." Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Ağustos 7, 2020. <https://cabar.asia/en/the-processes-of-politicizing-islam-in-kyrgyzstan-impact-on-the-2020-parliamentary-elections> (accessed Ekim 14, 2020).

Sharif, Kajrat Lama. "Dastyrli emes islamdyk agymdardyn belsendi kyzmeti ulttyk ozindik erekshelikti zhogaltuga ushyratady (Active Activities of Non-Traditional Islamic Movements Lead to the Loss of National Identity)." interfax.kz. Eylül, 2011. https://www.interfax.kz/?lang=kaz&int_id=13&news_id=50 (accessed Aralık 20, 2020).

Авторлар туралы мәлімет / Information about authors / Сведения об авторах

Дәуіржан Бердімұрат – Дін әлеуметтану мамандығы бойынша PhD докторы, Оңдоқуз Майс университеті, Самсун, Түркия

Daurzhan Berdimurat – PhD in Sociology of Religion, Ondokuz Mays University, Samsun, Turkey

Дауржан Бердимурат – PhD по социологии религии, Университет Оңдоқуз Майс, Самсун, Турция.