Recent Trends in Social Epistemology. Epistemic Injustice

Abstract

The second half of the twentieth century is marked for the theory of knowledge by the renewal of many areas and the emergence of new problems. The boom in information theory, linguistics, cybernetics, neurobiology and research into neuropsychological syndromes (conditions caused by brain injury) lead to the emergence of cognitive sciences. At the same time, against the backdrop of disputes between positivist-minded philosophers and post-positivists about demarcation, social epistemology is born. Despite the fact that social epistemology goes back to the sociology of knowledge and is rooted in the history of philosophy, it has revolutionized the corresponding branch of philosophy, created an innovative research program and, thus, a new research field. Research in the field of social epistemology is not limited to the explication of the socio-historical prerequisites of knowledge, but is aimed at clarifying the conditions of production, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in general, not only scientific. Thus, among the popular research areas today there are the epistemology of testimonial knowledge, epistemic disagreement, diversity and relativism, feminist epistemology, epistemology of group knowledge and much more. This article is devoted to the genesis and analysis of one of the newest and most influential concepts in social epistemology – epistemic injustice. The concept of epistemic injustice largely concretizes the knowledge-power relationship, so it can be successfully applied within the framework of postcolonial theory, the theory of new social movements, cultural studies and the philosophy of politics. Thanks to this concept, researchers have access to a new conceptual apparatus and approach to studying modern problems, be it the problems of «counter-expertise» or modern conspiracy theories.